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Summary 
The patentability of business methods has been debated over a long period of time, 
nevertheless the exact requirements for a business method to be patent eligible and their 
interpretation remain unclear both in the US and Europe. 
 Although the patent eligibility of business methods has not been an obvious 
matter in the US, the US courts and the US patent office has chosen to adopt a quite liberal 
stance towards this type of patents. The chief concern of the US courts has been to device a 
standard that will allow the patenting of business methods without granting a patent on the 
abstract idea itself. Many different approaches have been debated in case law but one of the 
most prominent standards is the machine-or-transformation test. Hence the connection to a 
particular machine, or the transformation of an object into a different state or thing, has been 
two of the main preconditions discussed in US case law in regards to business methods. 
 Even though the standards applied in Europe to determine the patent eligibility 
of business methods have varied slightly, the term ”technical” has always been central. The 
current test to assess the patentability of business methods is often referred to as the ”any-
hardware approach”. Despite the fact that this standard has relaxed the requirement for a 
subject matter to be regarded as an invention, the precondition of inventive step, that can only 
be judged on the basis of the technical features of an invention, is still a great obstacle to 
patenting business methods in Europe. Hence, the EPO applies a more stringent policy, in 
relation to the regime implemented in the US, and the fundamentally different starting points 
of the US and European patent systems make them difficult to compare. 
 The impact that the diverging regimes regarding business method patents 
implemented in the US and Europe have on competition is an important matter to discuss. The 
main motivation for creating a patent system, and thereby restricting competition, is to further 
innovation. The notion is that greater inventiveness will benefit society in several ways and 
that the special characteristics of knowledge compel the government to intervene on the 
market, incurring certain costs. One of the great benefits of the patent system is the possibility 
to trade knowledge through e.g. licensing agreements. However, there may be other 
circumstances to consider than the traditional economic rationales when discussing the 
positive and negative effects that patents may have on competition. The quality of patents is a 
widely debated matter, especially in connection with business method patents which are often 
referred to as weak patents. Investigating the welfare implications of licensing weak patents is 
only one way to discuss some of the possible effects on competition that the diverging 
policies applied in the US and Europe concerning business method patents might produce. 
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Sammanfattning 
Affärsmetoders patenterbarhet har diskuteras under en lång tid, dock är de exakta kraven för 
att en affärsmetod ska anses patenterbar och dessas tolkning inte tillräckligt klarlagda, varken 
i USA eller i Europa. 
 Även om patenterbarheten av affärsmetoder inte har varit en okomplicerad fråga 
i USA, har både de amerikanska domstolarna och det amerikanska patentkontoret uppvisat en 
förhållandevis liberal inställning till denna typ av patent. Det huvudsakliga spörsmålet i 
amerikansk rättspraxis har varit att hitta en metod som tillåter patentering av affärsmetoder 
men som ändå hindrar att patent på abstrakta idéer utfärdas. Många olika tillvägagångssätt för 
att uppnå detta mål har diskuterats i praxis men en av de mest frekvent tillämpade metoderna 
är maskin-eller-omvandlingstestet. Detta test fokuserar på huruvida patentansökan är kopplad 
till en viss maskin, eller om processen som ansökan beskriver inkluderar en omvandling av ett 
objekt till en annan form eller sak. 
 Trots att olika kriterier för att fastställa patenterbarheten av affärsmetoder har 
tillämpats i Europa så kretsar alla bedömningsgrunderna kring begreppet ”teknisk”. Den för 
tillfället aktuella metoden för att bedöma patenterbarheten av affärsmetoder kräver endast att 
en metod eller process är kopplad till en fysisk enhet för att betraktas som en uppfinning. 
Dock kan endast en uppfinnings tekniska komponenter ligga till grund för bedömning av 
objektets uppfinningshöjd, vilket utgör ett avsevärt hinder för patenteringen av affärsmetoder. 
Därmed uppställer det europeiska patentkontoret högre krav på patentansökningar som rör 
affärsmetoder än den amerikanska rättsordningen. Eftersom de amerikanska och europeiska 
patentsystemen har vitt skilda utgångspunkter rörande patent på affärsmetoder, blir en 
jämförelse av de kriterier som tillämpas vid bedömning av patenterbarheten av affärsmetoder 
svår att genomföra. 
 Effekterna som de olika möjligheterna att få beviljat patent på affärsmetoder i 
USA och Europa kan tänkas ha på konkurrensen är en viktig fråga. Den dominerande 
anledningen till att införa ett patentsystem, och därmed begränsa konkurrensen, är att främja 
innovation. Tanken är att större uppfinningsrikedom kommer att gynna samhället på flera sätt 
men att kunskap har vissa specifika egenskaper som gör att statlig intervention är nödvändigt, 
även om detta ingripande också leder till vissa kostnader. En av de stora fördelarna med ett 
patentsystem är att kunskap kan överlåtas, genom till exempel licenser. Dock kan det finnas 
andra aspekter som bör belysas än de traditionella ekonomiska bevekelsegrunderna i en 
diskussion kring de positiva och negativa inverkningarna som patent kan medföra ur 
konkurrenshänseende. Patentkvalité är ett vida debatterat spörsmål, särskilt i förhållande till 
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patent på affärsmetoder som ofta anses vara svaga patent. Att undersöka välfärdsaspekterna 
av att licensiera patent av låg kvalité är därmed endast ett tillvägagångssätt för att diskutera de 
möjliga effekter på konkurrensen som de skilda möjligheterna att patentera affärsmetoder i 
USA och Europa kan tänkas medföra. 
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Abbreviations 
Art. Article 
Board  The Technical Boards of Appeal and the Legal Board of Appeal of 
the European Patent Organisation 
CCPA  United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
EPC  European Patent Convention 
EPO  European Patent Office 
Federal Circuit United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
Patent Act  The United States Patent Act 
Supreme Court Supreme Court of the United States 
US  United States of America 
USPTO  United States Patent and Trademark Office  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The emergence of business method patents that occurred in the US during the late 1990’s 
caused a great stir in the patent debate and is still a controversial issue. While the US courts 
and the US patent office have adopted a liberal approach to this kind of patents, many 
commentators advance serious critique concerning the novelty and non-obviousness of 
business method patents and worry that the issuance of business method patents will stifle 
innovation. In Europe the patent office has chosen not to follow the regime implemented in 
the US and have instead put up strict requirements for patenting business methods.  
 The patent system is a tool for promoting innovation and social welfare, 
engendering both benefits and costs. The welfare impacts of patents are a key issue when 
discussing the patent eligibility of business methods and the constant tug of war between the 
granting of intellectual property rights and free competition is an important part of this debate. 
Moreover, the question if the benefits of the patent system always outweigh the costs is 
central. The diverging policies adopted in the US and Europe concerning business method 
patents create a platform for dicussing the important matter of the impacts that the disparity of 
obtaining this type of patents have on competition.  
  
1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this paper is to describe and compare how the US and European patent 
systems determine patent eligibility of business methods. I wish to explain and compare the 
basic legislation, case law and legal principles that have been applied to define patentable 
subject matter vis-à-vis business methods. My motivation for writing this essay is to compare 
the different approaches adopted in the US and Europe concerning business method patents 
and to discuss some of the plausible effects on competition that the diverging possibilities of 
obtaining business method patents in the US and Europe might engender.  
 
1.3 Definitions 
Defining business method patents is quite problematic since it is a very broad area, but in 
short terms these patents can be described as methods that seek to improve processes in the 
field of business.1 Distinguishing business method patents from software patents and internet 
patents is a difficult task since most business method patent claims consist of business 
                                                      
1 Duffy, Why Business Method Patents?, p 1248. 
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methods implemented on a computer through software or the web.2 Business method patents 
can be divided into different categories including: 
 
• Financial, such as derivatives, hedging programs, credit and loan processing, portfolio 
management, online banking, tax processing 
• E-commerce, such as auctions, transactions, user interface arrangements 
• Optimization, such as resource allocation 
• Marketing, such as catalog systems and advertising management 
• Information acquisition, such as accouting and human resource management3 
 
Nevertheless, these subgroups are only to be seen as a point of reference since the possible 
areas of use of business methods are countless. Examples of well-known business method 
patents are Amazon’s ”one-click” patent4, enabling customers that have previously filled in 
their address and credit card details on the webiste to make online purchases with a single 
click, and Priceline’s reverse auction patent5, instructing users to give their optimal price 
when buying e.g. airline tickets and then allowing sellers to bid for their business. 
 
1.4 Delimitations 
There are several requirements to obtain a patent on an invention, however this thesis will 
only concentrate on the preconditions that are the most relevant in relation to business 
methods. Furthermore, the focus of this paper is on the patent systems in the US, governed by 
the Patent Act, and Europe, implemented through the European Patent Convention. Hence, 
the national legislation of the different member states of the European Patent Organisation 
will not be discussed. Since most of the central issues regarding the patentability of business 
methods is debated in case law, only a brief introduction to the applicable legislation will be 
given. This is a thesis in law, thus the technical aspects of business method patents will only 
be explained to the extent necessary for the reader to grasp the main idea of the patent claim. 
 
 
 
                                                      
2 Hall, Business and Financial Method Patents, Innovation, and Policy, p 445. 
3 Hall, Business and Financial Method Patents, Innovation, and Policy, p 445, Lang, Redmann, Patenting 
Business Methods and Systems, p 144-145. 
4 Patent no. 5,960,411. 
5 Patent no 5,794,207. 
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1.5 Method and Material 
Comparative legal method will be used in this thesis. Considering the limitations set forth 
above, this paper will be a micro comparison, focusing only on the issue of patent eligibility 
of business methods in the US and Europe. When conducting a comparative study it is of the 
utmost importance to respect the system and hierarchy of sources in the legal systems being 
treated. It is also essential to be aware of the translation problems that can occur when 
studying foreign law, it is not certain that a legal term used in two different countries have the 
same meaning in both states. The object must be to compare how different legal systems 
regulate a specific problem.6 
In order to complete this paper I have used both US and European legislation, 
case law, academic articles, literature, studies and guidelines published by the EPO. Since 
there is a surplus of US case law regarding business methods and computer programs, I have 
chosen to describe only the judgements most important to understand the development of 
business method patents. In Europe the case law is more limited but I have still selected only 
the cases which are most cited regarding business method patents. The judgements will be 
presented in a chronological order to showcase the development that has taken place in case 
law. Regarding both the legal and economic articles and literature that I have referred to the 
goal has been to illustrate the many different opinions that have been given on the matter. 
Since I have chosen a subject that is widely disputed and still developing, I have been critical 
towards material that not only strives to convey the current legal situation or economic effects 
of business method patents but also wishes to convince the reader of a certain standpoint.  
To be able to debate the competition aspects of the different policies applied in 
the US and Europe, I will explain some of the basic economic rationales of the patent system 
and patent licensing. Moreover, I will briefly address the issue of patent quality, a hot topic 
that is closely associated with business method patents and their potential economic impacts. 
Since much of the debate regarding business method patents focuses on their presumed 
inferior quality, I believe that assessing some of the welfare implications of licensing weak 
patents could be an appropriate way of determining the effects on competition of the 
diverging possibilities to obtain business method patents in the US and Europe.  
Business method patents are computer-implemented and thereby closely linked 
to computer programs. Hence, case law concerning both business methods and computer 
programs are relevant to this paper. Nevertheless, the main focus of this paper will be on 
business method patents. 
                                                      
6 Bogdan, Concise Introduction to Comparative Law. 
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1.6 Disposition 
In the second chapter of this paper I will describe the relevant legislation and case law 
concerning business method patents in the US. I will also account for some of the comments 
made by academics regarding different judgements and legal principles concerning business 
method patents. The third chapter explains the European legislation and case law concerning 
business method patents and presents some of the issues debated by commentators regarding 
the case law of the European Patent Office, mirroring the first chapter of this thesis. In the 
fourth chapter I will compare the different regimes adopted in the US and Europe and present 
my conclusions regarding this comparison. 
 In the fifth chapter of this paper I will explain the basic economics of the patent 
system and patent licensing. Furthermore, I will discuss the matter of patent quality – both the 
different general perspectives that can be applied to this question and the more specific debate 
concerning the quality of business method patents and some of the reasons for their assumed 
inferiority. In this chapter I will also account for a few of the different opinions regarding the 
economic effects of licensing weak patents. 
 In the final chapter of this thesis I will discuss some of the different possible 
effects on competition of the diverging possibilities to obtain business method patents in the 
US and Europe, focusing on the licensing of low quality patents. 
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2. Business Method Patents in the US 
2.1 Legislation 
According to section 101 of the Patent Act the following are considered to be patent- eligible 
subject matter: 
 
” Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”7 
 
As stated by the above mentioned provision, it is mandatory that an invention constitutes a 
process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter to be patentable.8 This very broad 
definition has been limited by the Supreme Court, claiming that laws of nature, physical 
phenomena and abstract ideas cannot be protected under the Patent Act.9 The four categories 
can be divided into to groups; processes and products. The first group includes processes 
which are intangible and can be described as a series of steps taken to achieve a certain result. 
An account of a chemical process that will result in a new drug is only one example of a 
patent eligible process. The second group comprises machines, manufactures and composition 
of matter which are all defined as products. Manufactures can be characterized as any 
fabricated products and composition of matter is any composition of materials, e.g. the end 
product of a chemical process.10 
 In addition to the above mentioned requirements an invention must also be new, 
useful and nonobvious.11 Starting with the utility condition, an applicant needs to demonstrate 
a single, operable use of the invention that is credible to persons of ordinary skill in the art. 
The bar is set quite low, only demanding minimal proof that the invention is able to produce a 
pragmatic outcome. Neither is it necessary that the invention exceeds previous products or 
processes in performance, quality or in any other way to be considered patentable subject 
matter. 12 
 Regarding the prerequisite set out in section 102 of the Patent Act, that the 
invention should be new, two different assessments must be made. Firstly, the current art 
must be investigated to determine its dimensions. To perform this task, it must be decided 
                                                      
7 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 797.	  
8 Miller, Davis, Intellectual Property 4th Ed., p 22. 
9 E.g. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
10 Miller, Davis, Intellectual Property 4th Ed., p 22. 
11 Id. at p 25. 
12 Schechter, Thomas, Principles of Patent Law, p 61-62. 
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which sources of knowledge that are relevant for judging the novelty of the invention. Section 
102 lists certain references that can be taken into consideration when evaluating novelty, e.g. 
previously granted patents and publications. Secondly, the prior art, i.e. the references in 
section 102,  must be investigated and compared with the invention so that the novelty can be 
determined. 13 
 The last requisite, found in section 103, refers to nonobviousness, meaning that 
a skilled person in the same field and familiar with its subject matter should not have been 
able to develop the invention with ease.14 Similar to the inquiry regarding novelty, first the 
technology pertinent for the investigation must be distinguished and then the invention must 
be deemed nonobvious in comparison with previous references.15 
 
2.2 US Case Law 
2.2.1 The Business Method Exception 
Previously, the general view was that business methods were not patentable per se according 
to the ”business method exception” that is considered to have been created in Hotel Security 
Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co.16 In this case the defendant wanted to obtain a patent on a 
”method of and means for cash-registering and account-checking” that was intended to hinder 
the staff at restaurants and hotels from stealing.17 The court deemed the patent to be invalid 
because of lack of novelty but also added that ”a system of transacting business disconnected 
from the means of carrying out the system is not, within the most liberal interpretation, an 
art”.18  
Regardless of this judgement and other case law19 opposing the patenting of 
business methods, some argue that the USPTO has granted numerous patents on what can be 
seen as business methods.20 Hansmann maintains that many of the cases that are normally 
cited in support of the ”business method exception” do not resolve the question of the 
patentability of business methods, instead they are focused on the question of novelty. To 
demonstrate his point, Hansmann uses a quote from Hotel Security:  
 
                                                      
13 Id. at 73-74. 
14 Miller, Davis, Intellectual Property 4th Ed., p 71.	  
15 Schechter, Thomas, Principles of Patent Law, p 143. 
16 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908). 
17 Id. at 467. 
18 Id. at 469. 
19 See e.g. Ex parte Abraham 1869 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 59. 
20 Tew, Method of Doing Business, Hansmann, Method of Doing Business. 
 13 
”If at the time of Hicks’ application, there had been no system of any kind in restaurants, we 
would be confronted with the question of whether a new and useful system of cash-registering 
and account-checking is such an art as is patentable under the statue. This question seems 
never to have been decided by a controlling authority and its decision is not necessary now 
unless we find that Hicks made a contribution to the art which is new and useful. We are 
decidedly of the opinion that he has not…”.21  
 
2.2.2 The Mental Steps Doctrine 
However, the ”business method exception” was not the only obstruction for business method 
patents. Another principle, called the mental steps doctrine, hindered the patenting of 
computer-related inventions. According to the mental steps doctrine, processes that could be 
performed by the human mind are not patentable.22 Supposedly first formulated in a Patent 
Office Board of Appeals decision23, the doctrine was later mentioned in e.g. In re Heritage24, 
concerning a claim for a method of coating porous, sound-reducing fiber board. The court 
rejected the claim holding that the method was simply a mental process and therefore not 
patentable.25  
 Following Heritage, the CCPA in In re Musgrave26 strongly disapproved the use 
of the mental steps doctrine, calling it ”something of a morass”. The court argued that the 
doctrine was a vague term that gives little certainty to the law. 
Still, the Supreme Court upheld the principle in Gottschalk v. Benson.27 In this 
case, the applicant claimed a patent on a method for converting binary-coded decimal 
numerals into pure binary numerals. The claim was all-encompassing, covering any use of the 
method in a computer and the abstract process of the method without connection to any 
specific mechanism. 28 The court rejected the application, stating that allowing the claimed 
method to be patented would be to preempt the algorithm itself.29 Instead the court argued that 
”transformation and reduction of an article `to a different state or thing´ is the clue to the 
patentability of a process claim that does not include particular machines.”30 The judges also 
                                                      
21 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908) at 472 (empashis added). 
22 Schechter, Thomas, Principles of Patent Law, p 41. 
23 Ex parte Read, 123 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 446 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1943). 
24 150 F.2d 554, 66 USPQ 217 (CCPA 1945). 
25 Id.  
26 431 F.2d 882, 167 USPQ 217 (CCPA 1970). 
27 409 U.S 63, 93 S.Ct. 253, 34 L.Ed.2d. 273 (1972). 
28 Id. at 64. 
29 Id at 71-72. 
30 Id. at 70. 
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concluded that whether computer programs should be patentable is a question for the 
Congress to decide31 but did not discuss the CCPA:s decision in Musgrave.  
A few years later the Supreme Court again debated the issue of software patents 
in Parker v. Flook.32 The claimed patent described a method for updating alarm limits for 
certain industrial processes with the only new addition to the prior art consisting of the 
application of a mathematical formula to adjust alarm rates.33 The court chose not to apply the 
same reasoning as in Benson but instead held that the proper way of examining this type of 
process claims is to disregard the novelty of the mathematical formula and treat the algorithm 
as part of the prior art. Instead it is the process itself that should be new and useful for an 
applicant to obtain a patent.34 The applicant criticized this new approach, arguing that it forces 
examiners to assess the claim’s inventiveness under § 101, when it should rightfully be 
considered under §§ 102 and 103.35 In rejecting this line of argumentation, the court stated 
that the ”respondent's process is unpatentable under § 101, not because it contains a 
mathematical algorithm as one component, but because once that algorithm is assumed to be 
within the prior art, the application, considered as a whole, contains no patentable invention.” 
Hence, patentability cannot be based solely on non-patentable subject matter.36 
 Despite the outcome in Benson and Flook, the USPTO became more benevolent 
towards computer-related inventions during the 1980’s37 and in 1981 the Supreme Court 
reinforced this new attitude with their judgement in Diamond v. Diehr.38 The focus of this 
case was whether a process for molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision 
products could be patented. Although the process itself was known in the industry, the 
applicant held that it had not previously been possible to measure the temperature inside the 
press which made it troublesome to estimate the proper cure time. The applicant’s addition to 
the art consisted of  ”the process of constantly measuring the temperature inside the mold and 
feeding the temperature measurements into a computer that repeatedly recalculates the cure 
time by use of the mathematical equation and then signals a device to open the press at the 
proper time”.39 The court approved the patent and stated that the claimed method is the type 
of process that has historically been patent eligible since it describes the transformation of a 
                                                      
31 Id. at 73. 
32 437 U.S. 584, 98 S.Ct. 2522 U.S.(1978). 
33 Id. at 586. 
34 Id. at 591-592. 
35 Id. at 592. 
36 Id. at 594. 
37 Schechter, Thomas, Principles of Patent Law, p 50. 
38 450 U.S 175, 101 S.Ct. 1048, 67 L.Ed.2d 155 (1981). 
39 Id. at 175. 
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subject matter into a different state or thing,40 thereby applying the machine-or-transformation 
test.41 Concerning Benson and Flook, the court argued that these claims were attempts to 
patent an algorithm but that the respondents in this case are rather seeking to ”foreclose from 
others the use of that equation in conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed 
process”.42 The court also addressed the reasoning in Flook, concerning the division of claims 
into new and old elements when assessing the patentability of subject matter, deeming it 
inappropriate to dissect applications in this manner. Instead the novelty of parts of a process, 
or the process itself, should not be a factor when determining if the claim should be 
considered patentable subject matter. Thus the court rejected the approach used in Flook and 
instead stressed the importance of judging the claim as a whole.43 
Following this case the USPTO and the lower courts became more willing to 
grant protection to computer-related inventions and the CCPA created the Freeman-Walter-
Abele test.44 The test was first formulated in In re Freeman,45 and later revised two times, in 
In re Walter46 and In re Abele.47 An example of a judgement where the test was applied is 
Arrhytmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp.48 The claimed patent, called ”the 
Simson invention”, included both a method and an instrument for analysing 
electrocardiographic signals. Certain victims of heart attacks are especially vulnerable to a 
specific type of heart arrhytmia, called ventricular tachycardia, that makes the heart beat 
abnormally fast. Although there are drugs that can treat and prevent this condition, this 
medication has undesirable and sometimes dangerous side effects. Therefore, Dr Simson 
developed a way of determining which patients are at high risk for this special type of heart 
arrhytmia. The victim of a heart attack is basically monitored and if certain signals are 
detected, these are processed by an apparatus using a mathematical formula to ascertain if the 
patient is predisposed to ventricular tachycardia.49 The court gave the following definition of 
the Freeman-Walter-Abele test:  
 
”It is first determined whether a mathematical algorithm is recited directly or indirectly in the 
claim. If so, it is next determined whether the claimed invention as a whole is no more than 
                                                      
40 Id. at 184. 
41 Id. at 192. 
42 Id. at 187.	  
43 Id. at 188-189. 
44 Schechter, Thomas, Principles of Patent Law, p 44. 
45 573 F.2d 1237, 197 USPQ 464 (CCPA 1978). 
46 618 F.2d 758, 205 USPQ 397 (CCPA 1980). 
47 684 F.2d 902, 214 USPQ 682 (CCPA 1982). 
48 958 F.2d. 1053, 22 USPQ2d 1033 (Fed.Cir. 1992). 
49 Id. at 1055. 
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the algorithm itself; that is, whether the claim is directed to mathematical algorithm that is not 
applied to or limited by physical elements or process steps. Such claims are nonstatutory. 
However, when the mathematical algorithm is applied in one or more steps of an otherwise 
statutory process claim, or one or more elements of an otherwise statutory apparatus claim, 
the requirements of section 101 are met.”50 
 
After having concluded that the process claim included a mathematical formula, the court 
proceeded to determine whether the invention was still patentable. To answer this question, 
the court examined what the claimed steps do, independent of how they are implemented. The 
decision was that the claimed process was physical steps that transformed one tangible, 
electrical signal into another and the patent was therefore upheld.51 
 Only two years after the Arrhytmia case, the Federal Circuit seemed to discard 
the Freeman-Walter-Abele test in In re Alappat.52Alappat’s invention featured an 
oscilloscope, an electronic test instrument that allows observation of continuously varying 
signal voltages, and the claim was in lay terms ”an improvement in an oscilloscope 
comparable to a TV having a clearer picture”.53 The court did not apply the Freeman-Walter-
Abele test, instead it focused on Diehr and argued that the proper way to deal with the so 
called mathematical subject matter exception is to examine if the claimed subject matter as a 
whole is a disembodied mathematical concept. Even though all of the elements cited in the 
claim performed mathematical calculations, the court held that the invention as a whole was 
not an abstract idea, but rather a specific machine to produce a useful, concrete and tangible 
result.54 The PTO’s concern that the patent would cover a general purpose computer that used 
software to perform the claimed mathematical algorithm was also rejected by the court. The 
court stated that since the claimed patent creates a new machine, ”a general purpose computer 
in effect becomes a special purpose computer once it is programmed to perform particular 
functions pursuant to instructions from program software”.55  
 
 
 
 
                                                      
50 Id. at 1058. 
51 Id. at 1059. 
52 33 F.3d 1526, 31 USPQ2d 1545 (Fed.Cir. 1994). 
53 Id. at 1537. 
54 Id. at 1544. 
55 Id. at 1545. 
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2.2.3 The Turning Point for Business Method Patents 
State Street Bank v. Signature Financial Group56 is argued to be the first case where the 
Federal Circuit openly rejected the application of the ”business method exception”. The 
patent held by Signature can be categorized as a data processing system for implementing an 
investment structure called ”Hub and Spoke”. In short terms, the system enables individual 
mutual funds, called Spokes, to pool their assets in an investment portfolio, called Hub, 
organized as a partnership. The benefits of this arrangement are that the administrator of a 
mutual fund is afforded with the advantageous combination of economies of scale in 
administering investments coupled with the tax advantages of a partnership. Signature and 
State Street had negotiated concerning a possible license for State Street to use Signature’s 
data processing system but no deal was struck. State Street brought a declatory judgement 
action against Signature, with the goal to invalidate Signature’s patent.57 The Federal Circuit 
explained that for a mathematical algorithm to be patentable it must be applied in a ”useful” 
way, and not solely represent an abstract idea constituting disembodied concepts and truths. 
Signature’s patent was seen as a practical application of a mathematical algorithm since it 
produces ”a useful, concrete and tangible result” consisting of a final share price.58 Regarding 
the ”business method exception” the court held that they wanted to ”take the opportunity to 
lay this ill-conceived exception to rest” and stated that business methods have been subjected 
to the same legal requirements for patentability as applied to any other process or method 
since the 1952 Patent Act. 59 
The Federal Circuit continued with the same line of argumentation in AT&T 
Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc,60 where the ”useful, concrete and tangible result” 
standard reappeared. The patent in this case was a method, including a mathematical formula, 
for obtaining information about long-distance callers that could later be used for billing 
purposes.61Concerning the Freeman-Walter-Abele test, the court stated that the test was 
questioned in State Street and that ”whatever may be left of this earlier test, if anything, this 
type of physical limitations analysis seems of little value” after Diehr and Alappat where the 
useful, concrete and tangible standard was introduced.62 
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 Regardless of the Federal Circuit’s positive approach to business method 
patents, the Supreme Court expressed a more reserved view of the matter in eBay Inc v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C.63 In this case justices Kennedy, Souter, Stevens and Breyer held that 
some business method patents are vague and of suspect validity.64 The judgement in State 
Street and the ”useful, concrete and tangible” standard was also criticized by justices Breyer, 
Stevens and Souter in LabCorp v. Metabolite Laboratories. 65 The three justices argued that 
the Supreme Court has never approved the ”useful, concrete and tangible” standard and ”if 
taken literally, the statement would cover instances where this court has held the contrary”.66  
 The Federal Circuit got the opportunity to respond to these comments in In re 
Bilski.67 The claim was for a method of hedging risk in the field of commodities trading 
involving three steps. The method focused on the risk aversion of buyers and sellers on the 
energy market and suggested a solution to this problem by using an intermediary that would 
sell and buy at a fixed price based upon historical averages.68 To answer the question whether 
the claim in this case was a patentable process under section 101, the court took guidance 
from Diehr and Benson and found that the issue at hand was if the patent recites a 
fundamental principle and if so, whether it would pre-empt all uses of that principle.69 The 
court found that the Supreme Court had devised a test to determine if a claim is narrow 
enough, namely the machine –or- transformation test. This test was articulated in Benson and 
according to the Federal Circuit a process is definitely patentable if it is tied to a particular 
machine or apparatus or if it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.70 The 
Federal Circuit even held that the machine – or -transformation test was ”the sole test 
governing section 101 analyses.”71 After having examined the claim, the court concluded that 
it was a purely mental process of performing mathematical calculations without the help of a 
computer or any other physical apparatus and deemed the invention unpatentable.72  
 The Federal Circuit’s decision was criticized first by academics,73 and later by 
the Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos.74 In this case, the Supreme Court asserted that the 
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machine – or –transformation test is not the sole test for patentability under section 101, 
although the standard might be useful and an important clue. Instead the court held that 
guidance should be sought in its previous judgements in Benson, Flook and Diehr, but also 
added that the Federal Circuit is free to device other limiting criteria that are in concord with 
the Patent Act.75 The court also clarified that section 101 ”precludes a reading of the term 
”process” that would categorically exclude business methods.”  Regarding the patent claim, 
the Supreme Court held that the applicant is trying to patent both the concept of hedging risk 
and the application of that concept to energy markets. According to the court these are 
unpatentable abstract ideas, just like the algorithm in Benson. 76 
 Following Bilski, which gave limited guidance on how to judge patent eligibility 
under section 101, the Federal Circuit issued Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC.77 The patent in 
question claimed ”a method for distributing copyrighted products (e.g.., songs, movies, 
books) over the Internet where the consumer receives a copyrighted product for free in 
exchange for viewing an advertisement, and the advertiser pays for the copyrighted 
content”.78 The court discussed the difficulty of defining the non-patentable category of 
abstract ideas and held that although the machine- or- transformation test was useful during 
the industrial age, the test has a much more narrow application in the information age. 
Continuing, the Federal Circuit argued that although an abstract idea is not patent eligible 
subject matter, an application of an abstract idea may well be patentable. 79 Concerning the 
claim at hand, the court stated that even if the idea that advertising as a form of currency is 
too abstract to be patented, the patent claim described a practical application of the idea. The 
method required complex computer programming, which according to the court contributed to 
the claim being patent eligible. The claim also fulfilled the machine – or –transformation test 
since ”programming creates a new machine, because a general purpose computer in effect 
becomes a special purpose computer once it is programmed to perform particular functions 
pursuant to instructions from program software”.80 
 One of the most recent cases dealing with business method patents decided by 
the Federal Circuit is CLS Bank v. Alice Corp.81 The patents in this judgement were described 
as follows: ”these patents cover a computerized trading platform for exchanging obligations 
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in which a trusted third party settles obligations between a first and second party so as to 
eliminate ’settlement risk’. Settlement risk is the risk that only one party's obligation will be 
paid, leaving the other party without its principal. The trusted third party eliminates this risk 
by either (a) exchanging both parties' obligations or (b) exchanging neither obligation.”82 
Noting that the ”abstract ideas” test has become a pressing issue,83 the court argued that an 
abstract idea will not become patent eligible subject matter simply because that idea is 
implemented on a computer. However, after quoting several cases84, the Federal Circuit stated 
that ”it can, thus, be appreciated that a claim that is drawn to a specific way of doing 
something with a computer is likely to be patent eligible whereas a claim to nothing more 
than the idea of doing that thing on a computer may not. But even with that appreciation, 
great uncertainty remains, and the core of that uncertainty is the meaning of the ’abstract 
ideas’ exception.”85 Only after a full examination of the claim with the result that it is 
manifestly evident that the patent is nothing more than an abstract idea, can a claim be 
rejected as inadequate under section 101.86 Regarding the patent claim in this case, the court 
argued that even though the computer implementation of the patent probably would satisfy 
the machine – or- transformation test, this is not sufficient. Nevertheless, the computer 
limitations are significant for the process and the claims are restricted to a particular 
application of the concept of employing an intermediary to benefit trade between parties. 
Hence the court approved of the patent claim and stated that ”the limitations of the claims as 
a whole, not just the computer implementation standing alone, are what place meaningful 
boundaries on the meaning of the claims in this case.”87 
 Shortly after the CLS Bank case, the Federal Circuit issued another judgement 
concerning business method patents, Bancorp Services LLC v. Sun Life Assurance of 
Canada.88 The claim was for systems and methods for administering and tracking the value of 
life insurance policies in separate accounts.89 The court declared that ”to salvage an otherwise 
patent-ineligible process, a computer must be integral to the claimed invention, facilitating the 
process in a way that a person making calculations or computations could not.” In spite of the 
claimed method being computer implemented, the Federal Circuit held that the computer was 
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only used to perform the most basic functions and therefore did not limit the claim in any 
meaningful way. The patent claim was therefore rejected as simply an abstract idea.90 The 
court also addressed their decision in CLS Bank, which may seem to contradict the judgement 
in Bancorp, arguing that the difference between the two cases is that in CLS Bank the 
computer limitations played a significant part, unlike the computer limitations in Bancorp. In 
addition the Federal Circuit declared that the claim in CLS Bank was directed to a very 
specific application, but the patent claims in Bancorp were too broad and abstract.91 After the 
judgement in Bancorp was issued the Federal Circuit granted a petition by CLS Bank for 
rehearing en banc and vacated the court’s decision in CLS Bank.92 
 
2.3 Summary 
The patent-eligibility of business methods is a long running debate in the US, the question 
was first addressed in case law in the early nineteen hundreds. Initially business methods were 
excluded from the patent system on two grounds; the business method exception that declared 
business methods as unpatentable per se, and the mental steps doctrine that barred any 
process that could be performed by the human mind from being patented. From the beginning 
the application of these two principles has been unclear with some judgements rejecting them 
as vague and troublesome, while others defended their use.  
Nevertheless, the attitude of the US courts has been quite open towards these 
kinds of patent claims and new tests to determine patentable subject matter have continuously 
been devised. One of the key issues for the US courts has been to prevent business method 
patents from pre-empting the use of an algorithm since the applicant would then basically 
hold a monopoly on the abstract idea. Designing a practice that obstructs the patenting of pure 
mathematical formulas, but still allows business methods to gain protection, has nonetheless 
proved to be a difficult task. The machine-or-transformation test is one approach that the US 
courts often seem to fall back on. Already in Benson the Supreme Court mentions the 
transformation of an object into a different state or thing as an important component when 
determining if a method claim is patentable subject matter. This line of thought was further 
developed in Diehr, where the claimed process did include the transformation of an article. 
One of the deciding factors for the court’s decision to grant the applicant with a patent seems 
to have been the fact that the algorithm was an integral part of a traditional industrial process 
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that produced an end product, thereby limiting the scope of the patent to encompass the 
mathematical formula only in conjunction with all the other components of the claimed 
process. After disappearing from the limelight for a period of time, the machine-or-
transformation test reappeared in Bilski with full strength. The court held this approach as the 
sole viable test for determining patent eligible subject matter under section 101. However, this 
statement was soon discarded by the Supreme Court, who would only agree to classify the test 
as a useful and important clue, not the single practice for examining business method claims. 
Another method used by the US courts to try to define patentable subject matter 
is the useful, concrete and tangible standard. First articulated in Alappat, and later also 
applied in State Street, the test focuses on the the claim as a whole and seeks to determine 
patentability by examining if the method produces a useful, concrete and tangible result. 
Hence, a practical application of the algorithm is required and mathematical formulas that 
solely represent disembodied, abstract ideas should be rejected. In State Street the useful, 
concrete and tangible result that the practical application of the algorithm produced was a 
final share price. Nevertheless, this standard was criticized by justices of the Supreme Court 
and later discarded in Bilski.  
Several other tests have been created by the US courts to try to solve the 
problem of business method patents, e.g. the Freeman-Walter-Abele test, but none of them 
have survived for any longer period of time. The latest verdict from the Supreme Court in 
Bilski dictates that the US courts are to apply the machine-or-transformation test and that they 
should find guidance in Benson, Flook and Diehr. However, the Supreme Court also 
encouraged the lower courts to develop other limiting standards that are in line with the Patent 
Act. Consequently, which circumstances that determine the patent eligibility of business 
methods have still not been sufficiently clarified, however it is manifest that certain business 
methods are regarded as patentable subject matter in US case law. 
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3. Business Method Patents in Europe 
3.1 Legislation 
According to article 52 of the European Patent Convention (EPC) the following are patentable 
inventions: 
(1)European patents shall be granted for any inventions, in all fields of technology, provided 
that they are new, involve an inventive step and are susceptible of industrial application.  
(2)The following in particular shall not be regarded as inventions within the meaning of 
paragraph 1: 
 
(a)discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods;  
 
(b)aesthetic creations;  
 
(c)schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or doing business, 
and programs for computers;  
 
(d)presentations of information.  
 
(3)Paragraph 2 shall exclude the patentability of the subject matter or activities referred to 
therein only to the extent to which a European patent application or European patent relates 
to such subject‑matter or activities as such.93 
 
To be granted a patent article 52 EPC states that an invention must be new. To be regarded as 
new the invention cannot be part of the state of the art, i.e. ”everything made available to the 
public by means of a written or oral description, by use, or in any other way, before the date 
of filing of the European patent application”.94  
 Furthermore, the invention should be susceptible of industrial application 
meaning that it can be made or used in any kind of industry, comprising agriculture.95 The 
term ”industry” should be extensively interpreted including all physical activity of ”technical 
character”, e.g. manufactures, machines and processes.96 Regarding the condition that the 
invention should be of ”technical character”, it is stated that the applicant must be able to 
show that the invention relates to a technical field, is concerned with a technical problem and 
has technical features.97 
 Another requirement is that the invention must involve an ”inventive step”. This 
condition entails that, considering the state of the art, the invention should not be obvious to a 
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person skilled in the art.98 In case law a person skilled in the art is described as ”a skilled 
practitioner in the relevant field of technology, who is possessed of average knowledge and 
ability and is aware of what was common general knowledge in the art at the relevant date.”99 
 Although programs for computers and business methods are excluded from 
patentability according to art 52(2), the expression ”as such” in art 52(3) is considered to 
establish that if the subject matter has a technical character it is still patent eligible.100 
 
3.2 European Case Law 
3.2.1 Technical Contribution 
The first case that concerned computer-implemented inventions and the term technical 
contribution that was reviewed by the Technical Boards of Appeal was Vicom.101 The 
applicants wanted to obtain a patent for a method and apparatus for improved digital image 
processing.  The Board discussed whether the claim was simply a mathematical method as 
such and stated that if a process is carried out on a physical object, which could be a material 
entity but also an image stored as an electric signal, by some technical means implementing 
the method and resulting in a change in that object, the mathematical algorithm has then been 
applied in a technical process. The technical means could involve a computer comprising 
suitable hardware or a programmed general purpose computer.102 Thereby the Board stated 
that ”even if the idea underlying an invention may be considered to reside in a mathematical 
method a claim directed to a technical process in which the method is used does not seek 
protection for the mathematical method as such”.103 The conclusion of the Board was that in 
general an invention should not be regarded as non-patentable simply because modern 
technology is needed for its application and that the determining factor should be what 
technical contribution the invention as a whole makes to the prior art.104 
Following Vicom, only a few years later the Board elaborated further on the 
interpretation of the condition that the invention should be of technical character in Koch & 
Sterzel.105 The claim concerned an X-ray machine incorporating a computer program which 
controls and produces a technical effect in the X-ray apparatus.106 Siemens and Philips 
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opposed the patent, stating that the machine and the program should be evaluated separately 
since there was not continuous communication between the two and the technical contribution 
occurred only at the end of the process. However, the Board disagreed and held that it is 
irrelevant when the technical effect is produced, the deciding factor is that there is a technical 
contribution to any extent.107 A non-patentable computer program produces electrical signals 
that are no more than a duplication of information. Consequently these programs do not create 
a technical effect. A patent eligible program technically modifies the function of a general 
purpose computer by managing the operation of the computer. The computer and the program 
thereby create a patentable unit.108 Moreover, the Board argued that inventions should be 
judged as a whole and that the EPC does not prevent the patenting of inventions that consist 
of both technical and non-technical components.109 
 
3.2.2 Further Technical Effect 
In the late 1990’s the Board developed a slightly different requirement called the ”further 
technical effect” approach. In two very similar cases,110 IBM had made several claims to 
patent programs, e.g. a computer program product directly loadable into the internal memory 
of a digital computer. Previous case law dealt with claims concerning machines, processes or 
methods,111 but IBM:s applications were direct claims to computer software.112 In IBM I the 
Board concluded that art 52(2) and (3) EPC confirm that the legislator did not intend to 
prohibit all patenting of computer programs, but only programs for computers ”as such”.113 
To interpret the expression ”as such” the Board employed rules 27 and 29 EPC and held that 
the technical character of an invention is a fundamental precondition for a subject to be patent 
eligible.114 Regarding computer programs, it is not sufficient that the invention is a program 
for a computer to be considered to have a technical effect. The Board explained that the 
physical alterations of the hardware that computer programs control and execute cannot per se 
constitute the technical character mandatory for patentable subject matter since ”they are a 
common feature of all those programs for computers which have been made suitable for being 
run on a computer”.115 Instead there is a need for a program to produce a ”further technical 
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effect” to be deemed patentable. The Board held that: 
 
 ”Where said further effects have a technical character or where they cause the software to 
solve a technical problem, an invention which brings about such an effect may be considered 
an invention, which can, in principle, be the subject matter of a patent. Consequently a patent 
may be granted not only in the case of an invention where a piece of software manages, by 
means of a computer, an industrial process or the working of a piece of machinery, but in 
every case where a program for a computer is the only means, or one of the necessary means, 
of obtaining a technical effect within the meaning specified above, where, for instance, a 
technical effect of that kind is achieved by the internal functioning of a computer itself under 
the influence of said program”.116 
 
Hence, if a computer program is able to produce a further technical effect, it is to be 
considered as patent eligible subject matter.117  
According to some, the IBM rulings marked a shift in the Board’s approach to 
computer program patents. Previously the EPO tried to apply the same framework for 
computer implemented inventions as for physical machines, but after IBM I the Board instead 
turned to the vague term ”further technical effect”.118 
 
3.2.3 Any Hardware 
Shortly after the Board had presented the ”further technical effect approach”, new case law 
was issued that again changed the requirements for patenting computer-implemented 
inventions. In PBS Partnership119 the claimed patents consisted of a machine and a method 
that used certain standard factors to calculate pensions. The Board began by reaffirming 
previous case law regarding the requirement of technical character for a subject matter to be 
patentable.120 Regarding the method claim, the Board rejected the application holding that the 
invention was simply a business method as such since ”all the features of this claim are steps 
of processing and producing information having purely administrative, actuarial and/or 
financial character”. The applicant had argued that the data processing and computer means 
included in the method claim provided a technical effect but the Board disagreed and stated 
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that ”the feature of using technical means for a purely non-technical purpose and/or for 
processing purely non-technical information does not necessarily confer technical character to 
any such individual steps of use or to the method as a whole”. 121 However, the Board was 
more receptive to the apparatus claim that consisted of a computer system programmed to 
control a pension benefits system. The Board asserted that even if a machine is programmed 
to be used in a certain sector, e.g. the field of business, the apparatus is still a physical object 
and thereby patentable according to art 52 EPC. Since the terms ”apparatus” or ”product” are 
not mentioned among the exceptions in art 52(2) EPC, the Board reasoned that the distinction 
between a method for doing business and a machine designed to execute such a method is 
justified. According to the Board the physical features of an apparatus programmed to 
perform a business method could constitute the technical effect necessary for patentability.122 
The Board concluded that the arguments that were previously considered under the invention 
test according to the ”technical contribution” approach should instead be assessed when 
evaluating inventive step. 123 Even if the claim was regarded to be an invention, it was not 
considered to be non-obvious in relation to the prior art , distinguished as the existing private 
pension plans accounted for in the application.124 According to previous case law, only 
features of the invention that contribute to the solution of a technical problem by providing a 
technical effect should be taken into consideration when determining inventive step.125 Since 
the improvements of the claimed invention were primarily of an economical nature, these 
could not contribute to inventive step.126 This new stance is called the ”any hardware 
approach”, an expression introduced by Lord Justice Jacobs in Aerotel.127 According to 
Jacobs, examiners should ask ”whether the claim involves the use of or is to a piece of 
physical hardware, however mundane (whether a computer or a pencil and paper). If yes, 
Art.52(2) does not apply.”128  
Following PBS Partnership the ”any hardware approach” was further cemented 
in Hitachi/Auction Method129 where the claims concerned an automatic auction method, an 
apparatus for executing an automatic auction via a network and a computer program that 
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performs the claimed method.130 The Board began by reviewing earlier case law and 
discussing the requirements of the EPC. That a subject is an invention according to art 52 
EPC, i.e. a subject matter having technical character, is a condition to continue to discuss 
novelty, inventive step and industrial application of the invention since these latter 
prerequisites are settled only for inventions according to art 54(1), 56 and 57 EPC. 
Henceforth, it should be possible to assess the patentability of a subject under art 52(2) EPC 
without any knowledge about the prior art.131 The previously applied technical contribution 
test demanded that ”the invention involves some contribution to the art in a field not excluded 
from patentability".132 Consequently, the technical contribution approach requiered that the 
examinator also estimated the novelty and inventive step of the subject matter to be able to 
judge whether an invention according to art 52 EPC was submitted in the claim.133 The Board 
pointed out that in later decisions this opinion changed and it was stated in case law that 
"there is no basis in the EPC for distinguishing between 'new features' of an invention and 
features of that invention which are known from the prior art when examining whether the 
invention concerned may be considered to be an invention within the meaning of Article 
52(1) EPC. Thus there is no basis in the EPC for applying this so-called contribution approach 
for this purpose."134 It was considered more appropriate to examine the technical contribution 
that an invention makes to the prior art within in the framework of the novelty and inventive 
step assessment.135 The Board also claimed that since it is possible for a patent eligible 
invention to have both technical and non-technical features, and because these different 
aspects can be difficult to separate, the examination of the technical effect of the invention is 
better suited to be carried out when assessing the inventive step requirement.136 Based on 
these arguments the Board argued that the apparatus claim fulfilled the invention condition in 
art 52 EPC since it includes technical features such as ”server computer”, ”client computer” 
and ”network”.137 Regarding the method claim, the Board substantially departed from 
previous case law when it argued that a method involving technical means is an invention 
according to art 52 EPC.138 In PBS Partnership it was argued that ”a feature of a method 
which concerns the use of technical means for a purely non- technical purpose and/or for 
                                                      
130 Id. at V. 
131 Id. at 3.1. 
132 T 38/86. 
133 T-258 /03 at 3.2. 
134 T 931/95. 
135 T 1173/97. 
136 T-258 /03 at 3.6. 
137 Id. at 3.7-3.8. 
138 Id. at 4.1 and 4.7.	  
 29 
processing purely non-technical information does not necessarily confer a technical character 
to such a method.”139 Nevertheless, the Board explained that since the technical contribution 
approach is viewed as inappropriate for assessing the invention requirement in art 52 EPC, 
and because the above accounted for discussion is valid for all categories of claims, there is 
no need to further examine the technical aspects of a claimed method to define the technical 
character of that method.140 The board declared that ”what matters having regard to the 
concept of "invention" within the meaning of Article 52(1) EPC is the presence of technical 
character which may be implied by the physical features of an entity or the nature of an 
activity, or may be conferred to a non-technical activity by the use of technical means.” 
Accordingly, only purely abstract ideas lacking of any technical aspects should be regarded as 
non-patentable subject matter.141 The Board confessed that this wide interpretation of the term 
”invention” means that even the most ordinary activities will be included, e.g. the act of 
writing using pen and paper, but considered that the prerequisites of novelty, inventive step 
and industrial application prevents patentability of all methods including technical means.142 
Although this approach significantly eases the applicants burden to prove technical character, 
the requirement of inventive step has instead become the chief obstacle to a successful patent 
claim.143 When assessing inventive step, the EPO uses a ”problem-and-solution approach” 
which consists of three main steps: 
 
1. determining the "closest prior art",  
2. establishing the "objective technical problem" to be solved, meaning the identification of 
the technical features of the subject matter and their technical effect, and  
3. considering whether or not the claimed invention, starting from the closest prior art and the 
objective technical problem, would have been obvious to a skilled person.144 
 
Regarding computer programs and business method patents, the most problematic part of the 
inventive step assessment is to prove technical effect.145 In the current case, the invention 
solved the problem of delay between bidders and the server by adapting the auction method 
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so that it could be executed automatically, which according to the applicant rendered the 
invention technical effect.146 The Board disagreed and stated that the solution did not 
contribute to the technical character of the invention and can thereby not be taken into 
condsideration when determining inventive step. Thus the Board held that ”method steps 
consisting of modifications to a business scheme and aimed at circumventing a technical 
problem rather than solving it by technical means cannot contribute to the technical character 
of the subject matter claimed.”147 The Board recognized the fact that a method can have 
technical character if it is designed in a way as to be specifically suitable for computer-
implementation and that the claimed invention might have a technical feature that does not 
correspond to how a human being would perform an auction without computer support. 
Nevertheless, the programming measures needed to perform the claimed method was 
according to the Board obvious to a skilled person.148 
 The development of the ”any hardware approach” continued in 
Microsoft/Clipboard formats149 where the Board examined a claim for a method that 
improved the function of Windows 3.1 and a computer program that performed the claimed 
method.150 Refering to Hitachi, which states that a method using technical means is an 
invention according to art 52 EPC, the Board held that a computer system comprising a 
memory is a technical means and thereby patent eligible subject matter. To clarify matters the 
Board explained that ”a method implemented in a computer system represents a sequence of 
steps actually performed and achieving an effect, and not a sequence of computer-executable 
instructions (i.e. a computer program) which just have the potential of achieving such an 
effect when loaded into, and run on, a computer.”151 Therefore a method of operating a 
computer may include a computer program, but the claim to the method is not a claim to the 
computer program ”as such”.152 The computer program was also viewed to have technical 
character ”since it relates to a computer-readable medium, i.e. a technical product involving a 
carrier.”153 Regarding the requirement of inventive step, the Board identified Windows 3.1 as 
the closest prior art and maintained that the claimed method solved the issue of facilitating 
data exchange across different data formats.154 Since the invention was not seen as obviously 
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deriving from the previous operating system, the Board concluded that the condition of 
inventive step was fulfilled.155  
The judgement of the Board in Microsoft has been much debated since 
commentators believe that the Board did not follow the same approach concerning the 
assessment of inventive step in this case as they did in PBS Partnership and Hitachi. Scholars 
argue that the Board did not apply the ”problem-and-solution approach” but found the 
invention new and non-obvious on conventional grounds. Moreover, the Board did not 
exclude the contribution of the non-patentable subject matter when examining if the invention 
included an inventive step. In both PBS Partnership and Hitachi features of the method claim 
that contributed to the subject matter fulfilling the invention test were later omitted as 
excludable prior art when the Board evaluated inventive step. In Microsoft, the Board did not 
disregard the unpatentable computer program when assessing the non-obviousness of the 
claimed invention. Henceforth, it has been argued by academics that any computer program is 
patentable under this approach, while business methods must meet higher demands to be 
considered patent eligible.156  
However, there are academics who contest this conclusion, e.g. Wagner claims 
that it is a great misconception that business methods are not patentable subject matter in 
Europe. Wagner basis his argument on the assumption that any computer-implemented 
invention fulfills the requirement of technical character imposed by the EPC, thus making the 
precondition of novelty and inventive step the decisive factors in patent claims. In his paper, 
Wagner has also conducted an empirical study of business method patents granted in Europe 
and their strategical use, based on data collected in 2004.157 Nevertheless, a more recent study 
made by Komulainen and Takalo shows that the fact that only the technical features of an 
invention will be considered by the EPO when evaluating the inventive step of the invention 
is a significant obstacle for patenting business methods. According to Komulainen and Takalo 
only three percent of patent applications including a business method lead to a valid patent.158 
 The most recent significant case concerning business method patents is Duns 
Licensing.159 The case concerned a method for estimating sales activity of a product at sales 
outlets using a data processing system and an apparatus for maintaining inventory based on 
                                                      
155 Id. at 7.3-7.5. 
156 Ballardini, Software Patents in Europe, p 567. 
157 Wagner, Business Method Patents in Europe and their Strategic Use, p 75-76, 79-81. 
158 Komulainen, Takalo, Does State Street Lead to Europe?, p 32-34. 
159 T-154/04. 
 32 
the result of the method.160 The Board decided to summarize the previous case law 
concerning patentability under art 52 EPC and held that ” having technical character is an 
implicit requisite of an "invention" within the meaning of Article 52(1) EPC.”161 Continuing 
the review, the Board stated that ”it is legitimate to have a mix of technical and "non-
technical" features appearing in a claim, in which the non-technical features may even form a 
dominating part of the claimed subject matter.”162 Regarding the term ”invention”, the Board 
argued that despite the fact that it may cause problems that there is no common definition of 
”invention”, the EPO has good reasons for not giving an exact definition since this allows a 
flexible interpretation.163 The key component of a patent eligible subject matter is technical 
character, henceforth any product, method etc, even if mentioned in the exceptions in art 
52(2) EPC, can be deemed patentable on the condition that technical character is present.164 
The Board maintained that the new wording of art 52 EPC, that holds that patents should be 
granted ”in all fields of technology”, also demonstrates the importance of technical character 
or ”technical teaching”, ”ie an instruction addressed to a skilled person as to how to solve a 
particular technical problem using particular technical means.”165 The Board emphasized that 
the requirements of patentability, i.e. invention, novelty, inventive step and possibility of 
industrial application, should be judged separately. The precondition that the subject matter is 
an invention should be initially assessed and seen as an absolute requirement, while the other 
conditions should be regarded as relative.166 The distinction between the different prerequisits 
for patentability are also in line with the legal term of ”invention” as it has been applied by 
the EPO. The Board stresses the difference between the legal concept of ”invention” and the 
layman definition, meaning a subject matter that is both novel and brings an inventive 
contribution to the prior art. According to the Board, an application of the ”technical effect 
approach” would entail a use of the layman definition of the term ”invention” and is thereby 
not consistent with the EPC. Moreover, there is no defintion of the prior art that should be 
applied in the context of art 52(2) EPC and since the Board deems it impossible that the 
contracting states should have overlooked such an essential point, any reference to the prior 
art regarding art 52 and 53 EPC would lead to ”insurmountable difficulties”.167 Finally, the 
”technical effect approach” should also be regarded as conflicting with the EPC because it 
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presupposes that "novel and inventive purely excluded matter does not count as a 'technical 
contribution'". The Board strongly opposes this standpoint and claims that ”a non-technical 
feature may interact with technical elements so as to produce a technical effect, e.g. by its 
application for the technical solution of a technical problem”.168 Concerning novelty and 
inventive step, the Board stated that these two prerequisits can only be established on the 
basis of the technical features of the claimed invention.169 The invention must also include a 
solution to a technical problem according to the ”problem-and-solution approach”. 
Furthermore, when assessing inventive step regarding claims that include both technical and 
non-technical features, it is vital to exclude any unpatentable subject matter since the 
invention must be in a technical field.170 Regarding the method claim the Board stated that 
gathering information concerning sales activities and using mathematical formulas to assess 
the acquired information are to be seen as business research methods that do not seek to 
resolve a technical problem relevant to any technical field. Methods of business research are 
excluded from patentability ”as such”.171 Continuing with the system claim, the Board 
concluded that the claimed subject matter is an invention according to art 52 EPC since it 
involves a processor.172 Even so, the claimed system did not include an inventive step since 
the only addition that the invention made to the prior art was the use of a new algorithm, 
excluded from the assessment of inventive step, since it does not solve any technical 
problem.173 
 
3.3 Decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeal 
In 2008 the former President of the EPO, Alison Brimlow, refered a number of questions to 
the Enlarged Board of Appeal in an attempt to clarify certain matters regarding the 
patentability of computer programs.174 The previous President considered that the Boards of 
Appeal had given different decisions concerning patent claims for computer-implemented 
inventions and therefore held it to be of fundamental importance that the Enlarged Board of 
Appeal should shed some light to the issue of software patents.175 After a lengthy discussion, 
the Enlarged Board reached the conclusion that the referral was inadmissible since it did not 
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fulfill the requirements of art 112(1)(b) EPC.176 The Enlarged Board then went on to consider 
the questions refered by the former President and found that the case law of the Board was 
consistent concerning all matters but one, namely if a computer program can only be excluded 
as a computer program as such if it is explicitly claimed as a computer program. On this topic, 
the Enlarged Board held that although there is a difference between the reasoning in IBM I 
and Microsoft, this divergence is simply a reflection of the development that has taken place 
in case law.177  
 In dismissing the referral and deeming the previous decisions of the Board as 
convergent, the Enlarged Board supported the current approach of the EPO regarding the 
question of patentability of computer-implemented inventions.178 Many had hoped that the 
decision of the Enlarged Board would clear up the many uncertainties that exist concerning 
software patents and the decision has been criticized by several scholars.179 
 
3.4 Summary 
From the beginning much of the debate in Europe has focused on the term ”technical.” In 
early case law, technical contribution to the prior art was necessary for a subject matter to 
qualify as an invention. Later on, the Board introduced the ”further technical effect” 
requirement, which was subsequently discarded for the currently prevailing ”any hardware” 
approach. One of the most important changes in the EPO:s practice is that the assessment of 
patentability is no longer performed in connection with the invention prerequisit, but instead 
executed when examining inventive step. This shift in methodology is marked by the 
introduction of the ”any hardware” approach, which recognizes any subject matter as an 
invention provided that the patent claim includes some kind of physical entity. Hence, the 
main focus of the patent process is now on fulfilling the requirement of inventive step. 
Nevertheless, the term ”technical” remains vital to the European patent system since inventive 
step can only be determined on the basis of the technical features of an invention. The current 
approach in Europe is therefore that a business method could qualify as an invention if the 
claim includes a physical feature, e.g. a computer, but the business method will still not be 
deemed as patentable since it does not solve any technical problem and thus does not fulfill 
the requirement of inventive step. 
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Although the EPO seems reluctant to abandon the condition of technical 
character, there are several scholars who argue that this would be a possible solution to some 
of the problems that the European patent system struggles with. It has been suggested that 
including all of the features of an invention when assessing inventive step would engender a 
more coherent practice and would free the examiners from the burdensome task of separating 
technical and non-technical elements of an invention. Moreover, this change could be seen 
through without any legislative changes since the EPC does not literally require inventive step 
to be based on only techincal features.180  
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4. Conclusions 
The US has for a long time been a pioneer regarding intellectual property law and has 
undoubtedly influenced the development of intellectual property law in the rest of the 
world.181 However, the case of business method patents has not been an easy matter to deal 
with, the inconsistent case law in both the US and Europe being the most obvious indication 
of the conundrum that these method claims cause. As of today, the two legal systems have 
fundamentally different views on how to react towards business method patent claims. The 
US has chosen to adopt a liberal attitude towards business methods and software, regarding 
both of these categories as patent eligible subject matter. In Europe, on the other hand, the 
possibility to patent business methods has been blocked since these kinds of processes do not 
solve any technical problem. 
 After having examined the legislation and case law concerning business method 
patents in the US and Europe, it is evident that these two legal systems are difficult to 
compare since their point of departure are manifestly different. Even though the patentability 
of business methods in the US has not been an obvious matter, the courts have still embraced 
the subject with a fairly positive stance and have tried to create standards for dealing with this 
type of patent claims that focus on the special characteristics of business methods. The main 
issue in US case law has been to device a test that will allow patenting business methods 
without preempting the abstract idea itself.  
On the contrary, the European case law is characterized by a more doubtful 
attitude towards business method patents. The EPO applies the same requirements for 
business methods as for other categories of subject matter that have traditionally been 
regarded as deserving of protection, namely the condition of technical character. Trying to fit 
business methods into this preconceived model of patentable subject matter has proved to be 
an impossible task, mainly because business methods do not aim to solve technical problems. 
The European patent system is, simply put, not designed for including non-technical subject 
matter such as business methods. Some might dispute the statement that business methods do 
not possess the technical character necessary to be considered patentable subject matter and it 
is true that the EPO has never offered any definition of the term ”technical”. Perhaps it would 
be possible for the EPO to develop the current terminology to also include certain business 
methods, however the current case law demonstrates that the technical character requirement 
excludes business methods from the patent system. Even if the standards applied in the US are 
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more readily adapted to business methods, the US courts also seem more confident when the 
patent claim includes an algorithm incorporated in an industrial process which is traditionally 
considered as patentable subject matter. Thus, there is no doubt that both legal systems have 
had great difficulty in approaching this new form of patent claims. However, the flexibility of 
the US system and the liberal standpoint of the US courts have turned business method 
patents into a reality. Despite the fact that the EPO has changed their method of examining 
patent claims, with the effect that business methods may be regarded as inventions if a 
physical entity is included in the claim, the fact still remains that business methods will not 
fulfill the inventive step requirement. Unless the EPO changes its practice, it seems that the 
debate concerning business method patents has reached the end of the road in Europe. My 
conclusion is therefore that the US and European patent systems have such fundamentally 
different approaches regarding business method patents that a comparison of the two legal 
systems is fruitless. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 38 
5. The Effects of Business Method Patents; an Economic Approach 
5.1 The Economics of the Patent System 
From an economists’ perspective, the rationale of the patent system centers around the 
incentive to innovate and social welfare.182 It is in the interest of society that innovation takes 
place and that knowledge is diffused, however a market that is characterized by free 
competition will not provide an optimal rate of innovation since knowledge is ”non-rival”. 
Knowledge can be utilized by several people at the same time, without it disappearing or 
decreasing in value from its use. Hence, knowledge is different from tangibles and is defined 
as ”non-rival” or a ”public good”. These characteristics result in the need for special 
considerations when examining the economy of knowledge.  
Because the marginal cost of exploiting knowledge is zero, the cost of the 
invention is labelled as a sunk cost that is incurred before the production of the invented 
product. Social welfare is created when a developed invention is made public and since the 
cost of the invention has been incurred already, the most advantageous to society would be 
free and unrestricted access to the invention. Furthermore, only new inventions are beneficial 
to society, the duplication of inventions are a waste of social resources. Inventions can lead to 
”positive spillover”, meaning that an invention is not only useful to the inventor but also to 
others who can utilize the invention concurrently without being forced to incur once more the 
cost of invention. The fact that the social return on inventions is superior to the private return 
is one of the core motives for restraining free competition. The private return on certain 
inventions might be too low to justify the investment, but the social return of those inventions 
could be high enough to legitimize the costs. Free competition will thereby not produce the 
optimal rate of inventions. Moreover, innovators acting on a competitive market could risk 
bankruptcy since an inventor is forced to charge a price high enough for the inventor to 
compensate his costs while competitors could charge customers only their marginal cost. The 
threat of ruin will deter investments in research. Another possible effect of these 
circumstances could be that companies keep their inventions secret, forcing others to re-
invent the same piece of knowledge and thereby wasting social resources.  
The situation described above asserts the need for government intervention and 
the creation of intellectual property rights. The patent system is a privatization of knowledge, 
allowing the inventor to block others from exploiting the invention or to grant access to the 
new invention under the condition that economic compensation will be rewarded. The 
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granting of exclusive rights thereby gives incentives to innovate by promoting personal gain. 
Nevertheless, costs are also incurred from the employment of intellectual property; restricted 
access to inventions will curtail the positive spillover effects of innovation. Academics refer 
to these circumstances as a trade-off between benefits and costs. The benefit of the patent 
system is the creation of incentives for research and development of new inventions and the 
cost is the reduced diffusion of knowledge due to the exclusivity granted to the inventor. 183 
A slightly different approach to the costs-and-benefits analysis has also been 
advanced, focusing on the granting of exclusionary rights in return for the disclosure of 
knowledge. According to this theory the benefits of patents include both the promotion of 
innovation and the diffusion of knowledge, while the costs are the temporary monopolies 
created by exclusionary rights. Furthermore, competition benefits from the patent system 
since it facilitates the entrance of new companies with limited resourses on the market by 
allowing trading of knowledge and creation of markets for technology. However, patents also 
incur costs for subsequent inventors who wish to combine new ideas with already existing 
inventions, a very common scenario since most inventions build on discoveries made in the 
past.184  
 
5.2 Economic Effects of Licensing 
From a general point of view, the effects of licensing agreements on the economy are 
diversified. One of the positive impacts of licenses is the fact that the invention is distributed 
to more people and thereby promoting a more effective diffusion of knowledge.185 By 
obtaining access to a superior technology, licencees will benefit from lower costs. 
Furthermore, cost reduction does not only serve the private interests of licencees but also 
produces social benefits in terms of an increase in industry output. More providers on the 
market will also force companies to lower their prices to the advantage of consumers.186 
Moreover, licensing advances a stronger vertical specialization among corporations, resulting 
in improved product efficiency. While certain companies are better suited to perform research 
and development, some firms are better qualified to perform manufacturing activities. Hence, 
the option of licensing agreements allow all parties to maximize efficiency in their area of 
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expertise, furthering the emergence of markets for technology.187   
In consequence, the rise of markets for technology engenders a surge in the 
demand for patents since the positive effects of licensing agreements and the prospective 
economical gains will induce companies to claim more patents with the intent of later 
licensing the invention to others. New entrants on the market, that are specialized in the 
research and development of new inventions, will benefit greatly from these circumstances 
and are also more prone to apply for patents than large, vertically integrated corporations that 
often employ their inventions in-house.188 An increase in patent applications prompts the 
diffusion of knowledge, leading to an augmentation of innovation in general, because of the 
cumulative nature of inventions.189 
 
5.3 The Quality of Business Method Patents 
There is an ongoing debate in both legal and economic literature concerning the quality of 
different patents.190 However, there are several different approaches to discussing patent 
quality. From a legal point of view, the quality of a patent depends on the likelihood that the 
patent would be held as valid by a court. The thoroughness of the examination in regards to 
inventive step and prior art are emphazised as deciding factors of patent quality from a 
technical standpoint. It has been argued that the economic notion of patent quality 
encompasses both the legal and technical perspectives. Legal uncertainty is disadvantageous 
to competition and investment, while low technical quality is also to the detriment of 
competition and augments business risks.191 Most likely these three perspectives are all 
interdependent since patents of high technical quality that are truly new arguably have a 
higher probability of surviving the scrutiny of the courts and are therefore classified as high 
quality patents also from a legal point of view. Moreover, only new inventions further the 
economy since re-invention is a waste of social resources and creates market inefficiency in 
the form of monopoly. Patent quality is also an important matter from a social welfare point 
of view since the incertitude of the validity of a patent may engender several costs, e.g. 
underinvestment, both in the technology covered by the patent but also in competing  
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inventions. Furthermore, costly litigation may be another consequence of low quality 
patents.192 
 The chief criticism advanced towards business method patents are that they do 
not fulfill the requirements of novelty and non-obviousness and would therefore be 
invalidated if challenged. Hence, many business method patents are regarded as weak patents. 
Dreyfuss argues that most business method patents that are issued are simply implementations 
of processes long-known by the industry but not documented.193 The lack of documentation 
poses a big problem to the patent offices since they are not able to efficiently examine the 
prior art to determine the novelty and non-obviousness of patent claims.194 Lemley also 
believes that the patent offices simply do not allocate enough time to conduct detailed prior 
art searches,195 while Merges maintains that the quality of examination is low due to the high 
turnover of employees at the patents offices.196 The high number of patent applications, also 
known as a patent flood, is advanced by Meurer as one of the reasons for the low quality of 
business method patents.197 Furthermore, Jaffe and Lerner claim that the independence of the 
patent office needs to be questioned, arguing that there is a general inclination among 
examiners to focus on satisfying applicants instead of guaranteeing the quality of patents 
being issued.198 A combination of all the above mentioned circumstances and the absence of 
an opposition process are the main reasons for the low quality of patents being granted in the 
US according to van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie.199 
Empirical studies have been made concerning the litigation of business method 
patents, resulting in the conclusion that financial method patents are disputed two to three 
dozen times more frequently than patents as a whole. One of the reasons for this high rate of 
litigation is, according to Lerner, the weak character of business method patents.200   
 Another approach that has been advanced by Lunney is that there has been a 
shift in case law, claiming that the non-obviousness requirement has lost its importance after 
the Federal Circuit assumed jurisdiction over patent litigation. Based on an empirical study, 
showing that the percentage of patents held invalid because of non-obviousness dramatically 
declined post-Federal Circuit time, Lunney wishes to prove the court’s pro-patent approach 
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but also the demise of the non-obviousness condition. The critique focuses on the assumption 
that the Federal Circuit has changed the approach of determining non-obviousness, 
concentrating more on secondary considerations, such as the commercial success of an 
invention, to decide its validity. The result of this change in case law is the facilitation of 
obtaining business method patents.201 
 Even if there seems to be a rather striking consensus among commentators 
regarding the low quality of business method patents, there are some scholars that have 
presented a different opinion. Allison conducted an empirical study to contrast business 
method patents with other patents, focusing on prior art references among several variables. 
The result of these investigations were that business method patent claims did not receive less 
examination compared to other types of patents and that the holders of business method 
patents invested the same amount of resources as other patent owners to obtain patent 
protection. In fact, the empirical evidence in this research implies that the quality of business 
method patents is higher than the average.202 
 
5.4 Effects of Licensing Weak Patents 
There is certain disconsent among scholars regarding the economic effects of licensing weak 
patents. One of the first to analyze the potential consequences was Lemley, who suggests that 
the system of granting low quality patents rests upon a form of rational ignorance. To build 
his thesis, Lemley first examined the costs of obtaining a patent and the patent prosecution 
process. Contrasting the heavy workload of examiners, who are e.g. forced to conduct both 
prior art searches and consider the technical matters of the patent claim, with the modest 
amount of eighteen hours that examiners in general spend on an application during the two -to 
three- years time of the patent prosecution process, it is no surprise that the quality of issued 
patents is low. Moreover, forty-six percent of patents that are challenged in court, where a 
final judgement is handed down, are invalidated.203  
Even if it is clear that the amount of time spent by examiners on patent 
applications is insufficient to judge the quality of the patent claim, Lemley argues that to 
determine if investing more funds into the patent prosecution process would be the best 
solution, how patent holders exploit their patents needs to be investigated. According to 
Lemley, only a small amount of patents being issued are actually used for licensing 
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agreements (five percent) or litigated in court (two percent). However, patent litigation is very 
costly. Lemley estimates that the average annual amount spent on only legal fees that are 
attributable to the validity of patents is around $1.05 billion.204 Despite the fact that there is no 
data regarding the percentage of patents being licensed for royalties, Lemley supposes that the 
number should be around five percent of issued patents. The reason for this very low 
estimation is that Lemley believes that most companies file patent claims for defensive 
purposes, i.e. to quickly claim an area of technology to later escape lawsuits. Moreover, most 
large corporations possess a large portfolio of patents and often agree to royalty free cross-
licensing deals. Companies also choose to apply for as many patents as possible, both because 
it can be difficult to predict which patents will be valuable in the future and to attract 
investments, but most of these patents will never be licensed. Non-practicing entities that only 
own patents to gain revenue from licensing agreements may have some success in licensing 
their patents to others, but there are probably also businesses that prefer to challenge the 
patent in court. Since there is no data concerning patent licensing in the US, Lemley makes a 
rough calculation that the annual licensing costs is around $525 million. The point that 
Lemley is trying to make is that since most patents are not used for licensing or litigation, 
their validity will never be questioned.205  
To increase the quality of patents being issued, examiners would need to spend 
more time assessing every application. Consequently, more money would need to be spent 
both by the patent office and by applicants. Fewer patents would be granted and the number 
of applications would probably drop due to the more strict examination process. Lemley 
estimates that an improvment of the patent prosecution process would engender an increase in 
costs of $1.52 billion. Litigation costs would drop by $262 million, since fewer patents would 
be issued, however the amount of funds needed to improve the examination process is still 
significantly higher. Lemley also considers the costs of other alternatives to improve the 
patent prosecution process, e.g forcing applicants to conduct their own prior art searches. 
Nevertheless, all the alternatives generate higher costs than the current system. Considering 
that a very low number of patents are ever litigated or licensed, the majority of funds spent on 
ameliorating the examination process would be wasted on patents that will never be used or 
employed in situations where their validity is not of importance. Hence, from a cost 
perspective society should accept the current low quality of patents and instead try to resolve 
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the issue ex post if the validity of a patent is challenged in court.206 
Farrell and Shapiro have also addressed the question of the effects of licensing 
low quality patents, examining the welfare economics of weak patents that are being licensed. 
They maintain that patents that are obviously invalid are harmless, while weak patents where 
the question of validity is uncertain and can only be determined in court, may pose a bigger 
problem to society. For the majority of patents their validity is never examined, even if they 
are being linsenced-out, and when a patent is challenged in court most parties settle before a 
final judgement is decided. Farrell and Shapiro seek to investigate if a patent’s market impact 
is proportional to it’s strength by using a model in which a patent owner offers licenses to 
downstream firms who can either choose to enter into a licensing agreement, avoid using the 
patented technology or infringe the patent, resulting in litigation. According to the model used 
by Farrell and Shapiro, weak patents that are licensed to downstream firms, that do not 
compete with each other or the patent owner, have a proportionally small impact on the 
market since only low royalties are commanded. However, when weak patents are licensed to 
downstream firms that are competitors, either to each other or to the patent holder, remarkably 
high royalty rates were commanded. The first contributing circumstance to this result is the 
fact that accepting a high per-unit royalty fee will increase the joint profits of both the patent 
owner and the licensees since the downstream price is brought closer to the monopoly price. 
The second basis for the outcome of the model used by Farrell and Shapiro is the low 
incentives for downstream firms to challenge the patent holder in court and perhaps invalidate 
the patent. Litigation and the possible invalidation of a patent will be a costly business for the 
downstream firm initiating the attack, but greatly beneficial to rival firms and consumers. 
Thus, the positive externality on competitors will hinder downstream firms from challenging 
patent owners and induce them to agree to surprisingly high royalty rates.  Consequently, 
there is a discrepancy between the royalty rates being charged by the patent holder and the 
expected royalty fees that could be commanded if patent validity was determined prior to 
licensing. The conclusion is that the impact of weak patents on the market is disproportionate 
compared to their actual strength.207 These findings do not only have negative ex post 
implications, but can also stifle innovation. Companies will not invest funds in projects that 
produce groundbreaking patents but will prefer R&D that result in small innovations that give 
a high reward compared to the strength of the patent.208 Examining all patents before 
                                                      
206 Id. at 1508-1511. 
207 Farrell, Shapiro, How Strong are Weak Patents?, p 1347-1349. 
208 Id. at 1354. 
 45 
licensing would reduce the deadweight loss created by the monopoly pricing that licensing 
weak patents to competitors results in. However, this is a very costly alternative. Farrell and 
Shapiro instead suggest a system of reexamination for patents claiming valuable technology 
that is useful to multiple downstream firms that rival with each other or the patent owner.209  
One of the latest contributions to the discussion concerning the effects of 
licensing weak patents is made by Encaoua and Lefouili. In their paper Encaoua and Lefouili 
use a model that is similar to the one designed by Farrell and Shapiro, however with some 
slight changes creating a more general framework. The results of the study confirms the 
outcome of Farrell and Shapiro’s examination, that the optimal structure for licensing weak 
patents is dependent on the level of royalty rates that hinders licensees from challenging the 
validity of the patent. If the maximum level of royalty fees accepted by downstream firms is 
above a defined threshold, the patent will be licensed at this rate and litigation will be 
deterred. Nevertheless, if the royalty rate tolerated by downstream firms is below the 
threshold, the patent owner may choose to license the patent for a higher fee, thereby risking 
litigation over the validity of the patent.210 Moreover, Encaoua and Lefouili question the 
conclusion drawn by Farrell and Shapiro that weak patents are always overcompensated, 
claiming that the expected maximal licensing revenues are a better measure than the expected 
maximal royalty rates when calculating the overcompensation of weak patents since it takes 
into consideration the number of downstream firms that accept the licensing agreement. 
Bearing this circumstance in mind, there are situations where weak patents are 
undercompensated if the royalty rate is low enough.211 The policy amendments proposed by 
Farrell and Shapiro are also challenged by Encaoua and Lefouili, who point out the 
informational constraints, i.e. the fact that the patent office has no information regarding 
which patents will be licensed to multiple rivals, making the suggestion presented by Farrell 
and Shapiro difficult to implement.212 Instead Encaoua and Lefouili believe that raising the 
incentives for downstream firms to dispute the validity of weak patents, by forbidding a 
patent holder to refuse licenses to defeated challengers and promoting a collective approach 
among potential licensees, would be a more successful approach to lowering the market 
impact of weak patents.213  
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6. Analysis  
The patent system rests on the notion that a privatization of knowledge is necessary to further 
innovation and social welfare. Hence, a fair assumption would be that any area of innovation 
that is included in the patent system will benefit from more ingenuity that will be of profit to 
society. The extension in the US of patentable subject matter to encompass business methods 
should mean that both companies and consumers in this area of innovation experience the 
positive effects that the patent system is meant to engender. Thus, there will be a greater 
diffusion of knowledge regarding business methods that would otherwise have been kept 
secret to hinder others from free riding. The creation of markets for technology that is 
prompted by the patent system will facilitate for new entrants on the market, making it 
possible for firms that do not have the financial strength to realize an invention to be able to 
capitalize on their idea. Furthermore, companies will gain access to superior technology, 
enabling firms to lower their prices. A stronger vertical specialization among corporations 
will allow companies to maximize their effeciency. The idea is that a rise in patents will lead 
to greater diffusion of knowledge and thereby more innovation. From this point of view, a 
patent flood is not necessarily a matter of concern. 
 However, there are also adverse effects of expanding the patent system. Since 
the costs of inventions are only incurred at the production stage, the most beneficial for 
society would be free and unrestricted access to all inventions. Henceforth, the exclusive right 
that is granted to the inventor in accordance with the patent system restricts society from 
taking full advantage of the invention. Moreover, the possible creation of a monopoly 
situation and the deadweight loss that this type of market failure creates could be a 
considerable cost of patents. Because of the cumulative nature of invention, the patent system 
can be seen as obstructing innovation since inventors can be forced to bare extra costs, e.g. 
licensing agreements, to be able to further develop already existing inventions. This 
circumstance can become especially problematic if the inventor wishes to combine several 
existing inventions and may hinder the development of new inventions.  
 Even if patents have certain unfavorable consequences, the motivation for the 
patent system relies on the assumption that government intervention is more advantageous for 
society than free competition. Therefore, one might conclude that the decision in Europe to 
bar business methods from the patent system is to the detriment of companies and consumers 
on the European market since they will not be able to enjoy all the beneficial effects that the 
patent system could engender in this area of innovation. The negative impacts of this policy 
may be strengthened by the fact that business method patents are granted in the US, creating a 
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difference in opportunities for firms based in the US and Europe that may effect competition. 
American companies are able to patent their business methods on a rather large scale, 
generating both the positive and negative effects discussed above. The strategic use of 
business method patents, such as licensing, defensive patenting and litigation, may afford 
American corporations with a competitive advantage over their European rivals. Considering 
the widespread and variating uses of business methods, a patent on such a process may be a 
forceful weapon, enabling the patent holder to e.g force competitors into licensing agreements 
under the threat of litigation. Amazon’s ”one-click” patent is a good example of a business 
method that has been widely implemented online and thereby allows Amazon to collect large 
licensing revenues. Companies on the market that are engaged in this area of innovation may 
prefer to locate their business in the US since the chances to commercialize their business 
methods can be seen as more promising there. Furthermore, since the patent system is 
supposed to promote innovation, a possible effect of the different policies regarding business 
method patents in the US and Europe could be that the US will enjoy greater innovative 
progress in regards to business methods, leaving Europe lagging behind. 
 Nevertheless, it may be possible that the disparity of policies could also have 
beneficial impacts in Europe. Since the patent system rests on a balance between costs and 
benefits, it is difficult to ascertain whether the profits of patents always surpass the expenses. 
The patent system’s concrete impact on innovation is very problematic to measure, thus it is 
possible that patents are not the most efficient way of furthering inventions. The assumption 
that more patents prompt more innovation can be criticized since new inventions are often 
based on already existing inventions, hence patent thickets compel companies to incur extra 
costs for inventions. Non-practicing entities, or patent trolls, whose sole source of income is 
licensing agreements, can take advantage of the liberal attitude in the US towards business 
method patents to construct an arsenal of patents, ready to be used against anyone refusing to 
accept a licensing offer. Studies have shown that business method patents are litigated at a 
considerably higher rate than patents in general, resulting in large expenses for companies. 
Moreover, the articles by Farrell and Shapiro and Encauoua and Lefouili indicate that many 
downstream firms will prefer to pay surprisingly high royalty rates over challenging the 
validity of a weak patent and face the risk of costly law suits where the outcome is often 
difficult to predict. Hence the possibility to patent business methods in the US may stifle 
innovation in this area, while inventors in Europe are free from in terrorem-effects and costly 
licenses when developing new business methods. 
 Except these more general presumptions regarding the plausible effects of the 
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discrepancy regarding business method patents in the US and Europe, there may be 
consequences that are related to the special characteristics of business method patents. The 
quality of patents has been a much debated issue, especially in relation to business method 
patents, with many commentators criticizing the patent offices and the courts for having a 
much to applicant-friendly attitude. However, measuring the strength of patents is 
problematic. Empirical studies that have been made try to judge patent quality by focusing on 
e.g. the number of prior art references in each application and the amount of hours spent by 
examiners and applicants on the patent prosecution process. From my point of view, these 
variables may not be appropriate indicators to assess patent quality since they do not give 
much information concerning the actual content of the patent claim. My belief is that to make 
an accurate estimation of the strength of a group of patents the novelty and non-obviousness 
needs to be examined as if the validity of the patent was being scrutinized in court. 
Nevertheless, research using the above mentioned type of data can still give useful indications 
concerning the quality of different types of patents. 
 The reasons given for the presumed low quality of business method patents are 
abundant, ranging from a lack of available documentation of prior art to examiner’s heavy 
workload and questioned neutrality. Assuming that the overall quality of business method 
patents granted in the US is inferior, the effects on competition could be troublesome. 
Dubious patent quality creates legal uncertainty, forcing firms to spend funds on litigation 
instead of R&D projects and thereby suppressing both innovation and competition. 
Furthermore, the low quality of business method patents can be perceived as an increased 
business risk, deterring firms from investing in this area of innovation. In addition, since only 
truly novel inventions are of profit to society, the granting of patents to insignificant or 
obvious inventions is a waste of social resources. Taking into account these circumstances, 
European companies and consumers may benefit from a more competitive market compared 
to the US. 
 To examine the effects that the diverging policies regarding business method 
patents have on competition in the US and Europe, investigating the impact of licensing weak 
patents could be enlightening. Applying Lemley’s theory of rational ignorance, it can be 
argued that the EPO spends to much resources on assessing patent claims that will never have 
any impact on the market. Therefore, the US system of a more relaxed approach to 
patentability requirements is more cost efficient. The negative effects of low quality patents 
described above may not be of greater notice if only a very small number of business method 
patents are ever licensed or litigated. Thus, according to Lemley the US approach is more 
 49 
beneficial to society and competition since it will engender lower costs. Nevertheless, 
Lemley’s assumptions can be questioned for a number of reasons. The presumption that only 
an insignificant amount of patents are licensed is a pure estimation made by Lemley and can 
therefore be disputed. The motivations for the very low estimate given by Lemley are not 
supported by any empirical evidence. Even if Lemley’s statement that a mere two percent of 
all patents being issued are ever litigated might be accurate, it is possible that this figure does 
not give the full picture of the situation. Lerner claims that financial method patents are 
litigated two to three dozen times more frequently than patents in general. Despite that 
Lemley’s argument that patents as a whole are not often disputed could be correct, it is 
possible that business method patents are overrepresented in the category of patents under 
litigation and thereby create disproportionately large negative effects. Hence, the European 
market may profit from the absence of business method patents if it is correct that this type of 
patents more often instigate law suits. 
 Farrell and Shapiro have assessed the effects of licensing weak patents and 
conclude that low quality patents often have a disproportionately large impact on the market 
related to their strength if they are licensed to competing downstream firms. According to the 
study made by Farrell and Shapiro, the acceptance of surprisingly high royalty rates depends 
on both the opportunity to increase the joint profits of the patent owner and the licensees, but 
also the low incentives for downstream firms to initiate law suits because of the positive 
externalities that would follow from an invalidation of the licensed patent. Henceforth, weak 
patents are overcompensated which in turn will prompt companies to invest more funds in 
small inventions that will generate high returns compared to their quality. Moreover, 
monopoly pricing will create deadweight loss and have negative effects on competition. 
Considering the result presented by Farrell and Shapiro, the effects of business method 
patents on the US market may be much larger than suggested by Lemley. Thereby patent 
holders can gain disproportionate market power by using business method patents as a 
strategic tool. From a competition standpoint, this is an important circumstance since only 
companies with certain market power can have any noticeable impact on the market. 
 Encaoua and Lefouili chose to use a more general framework for their model 
and claim that the effects put forward by Farrell and Shapiro are exaggerated. Even if there 
are situations where weak patents are overcompensated, Encaoua and Lefouili question the 
method used by Farrell and Shapiro to come to this conclusion, claiming that the maximal 
licensing revenues accrued by the patent owner is a better measurement that the maximal 
royalty rate since this figure takes into account the number of firms that accept to enter into a 
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licensing agreement. Hence, Encaoua and Lefouili suggest that the effects of licensing weak 
patents are more mitigated than what the study made by Farrell and Shapiro show. The exact 
impact that licensing weak patents have on the market is impossible to determine, however 
two of the studies accounted for above indicate that licensing business method patents have 
negative effects on competition under certain circumstances. Considering this fact, European 
firms and consumers will benefit from the more stringent approach towards business method 
patents adopted by the EPO, while American companies will experience the adverse effects 
that overcompensated weak patents produce on a larger scale since business method patents 
are more easily obtained in the US. 
 The above discussion clearly demonstrates the diversified effects on competition 
that the different possibilities to obtain business method patents in the US and Europe may 
engender. The traditional costs and benefits of the patent system are of course important to 
consider, however the notion that patents always further innovation and social welfare can be 
questioned. In my opinion, other aspects than the customary motivations for the patents 
system’s existence, such as patent quality, need to be considered. In a perfect world all issued 
patents would be iron-clad, however this is an unattainble scenario. The reality is that patents 
of inferior quality will always be granted and the reasons for this circumstance are many. The 
rate of business method patents that are of low quality is uncertain, nevertheless the storm of 
criticism that this kind of patents have caused at least gives reason to examine the effects of 
weak patents to try to determine the impact of business method patents on competition. I have 
chosen to closer assess the economic impacts of licensing weak patents to attempt to 
investigate the competition aspects of business method patents. Even though there is no 
obvious answer to this question, two of the more recent studies indicate that licensing low 
quality patents can have adverse effects on competition under certain circumstances. Hence, 
from this point of view, the more strict approach adopted by Europe concerning business 
method patents could mean that companies and consumers on the European market benefit 
from a more competitive market compared to American firms and consumers.  
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